There have been several landmark arms deals, along with a series of high-profile military exercises at sea and on land. The two sides agree on most international issues. They oppose liberal interventionism and have exercised their veto power in the UN Security Council to this purpose — most conspicuously on Syria.
They hold convergent views on North Korea and cyber-sovereignty. True, the Sino-Russian relationship is increasingly unequal. But so far this inequality has been fairly well managed. Yet this picture is less perfect than it looks. The Sino-Russian partnership, for all its dividends, comes at a price. So close do Moscow and Beijing seem that Russian policy in the Asia-Pacific often appears to be a mere extension of its relationship with China.
Their public displays of affection have had the effect of persuading others that the relationship is much closer than it is, that it amounts even to an authoritarian alliance. In fact, Russia and China are separate actors whose perspectives, interests, and priorities can diverge significantly.
For example, although they agree that the post—Cold War international system is unsatisfactory in many respects, they draw different conclusions. Beijing, by contrast, hopes to reform rather than replace the international system. Although Xi has pursued a more ambitious foreign policy than his predecessors, his vocal support for global free trade and combating climate change  suggests that he still sees the current framework, despite its flaws, as the only one available. For the time being, such differences are not critical.
It suits Moscow and Beijing to make common cause when their respective relations with the United States are so difficult, and when both regimes are under some democratic pressure. The recent joint air patrol points to growing tactical cooperation at the military level, but is scarcely evidence of a broader alliance-type relationship. The Kremlin recognises the pitfalls of becoming captive to a Beijing-first agenda. Recent semi-official publications note the potential for a domineering China, and a marginalised Russia, in the context of Greater Eurasia and the proliferation of the BRI.
In addition to continuing discussions with Tokyo over a possible resolution of their long-running territorial dispute, Moscow is reaching out to both North and South Korea,  while injecting new energy into its once moribund links with Southeast Asia. It is also working beyond the Asia-Pacific region: reinforcing ties with the Central Asian republics; taking an active interest in Afghanistan; stepping up security cooperation with Pakistan; pursuing intergovernmental and second-track diplomacy with India; and, farther afield, re-engaging with the political mainstream in Europe, and sustaining a personal rapport between Presidents Putin and Trump.
The rationale behind these wide-ranging initiatives is clear enough. However strong the partnership with China, it is unhealthy for Russia to rely on its good intentions or assume that their interests will invariably converge. Still, it understands the importance of expanding its options, while gently reminding Beijing not to take Russia for granted. Although cooperation with China will remain the bedrock of policy towards the Asia-Pacific, the quest for strategic flexibility is critical to promoting Russia as a major player in the region. Yet if the logic of diversification is straightforward, implementing it has proved anything but.
Moscow labours under several handicaps. This limitation is accentuated by the grim state and poor prognosis of relations with the United States. However, on each occasion negotiations have stalled. In recent years, determined efforts by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have offered fresh hope of a rapprochement. Abe, whose father Shintaro was one of the prime movers behind earlier attempts to finalise a peace deal, has adopted a pragmatic line premised on the unspoken belief that it is more important to reach an accommodation with Moscow than it is to obtain the full return of the islands.
That means finding some kind of face-saving arrangement over the islands. Abe has also soft-pedalled on G7 sanctions against Russia, and hosted Putin for a state visit to Japan in the face of American objections. And yet there has been no meaningful progress. Territorial negotiations are deadlocked, with Moscow making any deal contingent on a review read: downsizing of US—Japan military ties.
In fact, the main stumbling block in Russia—Japan relations is not the territorial dispute, but sharply divergent threat perceptions. Russian attitudes are reinforced by the conviction that Japan will inevitably prioritise its relationship with the United States. Viewed from the Kremlin, such a Japan has little to offer, certainly by comparison with China.
Maintaining a tough line towards Tokyo is therefore more logical than at first sight. Over time, the Japanese may become more nervous, wracked by uncertainties over the US security commitment to Northeast Asia and the rise of Chinese military power, and consequently more amenable towards Russia.
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Similar considerations apply to India. In theory, there is considerable scope for Moscow and New Delhi to develop a multifaceted partnership. India is already the largest market for Russian arms exports. There are also no particular bilateral difficulties. Russia may be a soft authoritarian regime, and India a democracy, but such differences have scarcely impinged on their relationship. Like Japan, India appears a natural candidate to be one of the pillars of a diversified Russian policy in Asia. And yet things have not worked out that way — and for largely the same reasons.
The most influential is the overriding importance of the Sino-Russian partnership. Against the background of continuing strategic tensions between Beijing and New Delhi, the Kremlin finds itself having to pick sides.
The growing warmth of US—India ties is another major impediment to an effective policy of diversification. Given that relations with Washington are at their worst in three decades, the Kremlin can hardly be expected to view a US-friendly New Delhi as a reliable partner, much less an alternative to Beijing. While India is certainly no enemy, it sides with the United States on several crunch issues — freedom of navigation, countering the BRI, and containing the projection of Chinese naval power in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans.
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In the circumstances, the most Moscow can realistically hope for is that India adheres to a benign neutrality. There is a third problem. The Russia—India relationship is limited. Beyond arms and energy cooperation, New Delhi has little to offer. India is a secondary actor in the Asia-Pacific region. Pakistan ticks many of the right boxes: its relationship with the United States is deteriorating rapidly; it is close to China; and it wields considerable influence in Afghanistan, where Russia is once again actively involved.
One of the big challenges facing Russia in the Asia-Pacific is to prove that it can make a positive contribution.
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The most plausible area is in security-building, where it has many of the tools to be a serious player: significant military capabilities; geopolitical reach; permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council; and a rich tradition of high-level diplomacy. Pyongyang has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons, while Washington is equally unwilling to ease sanctions without clear quid pro quo in the form of some disarmament.
However, the continuing existence of this arsenal has become yet another sore in the US—China relationship, with the two sides trading accusations of bad faith and provocative behaviour. Meanwhile, there remains the constant threat of Pyongyang upping the ante, whether as a negotiating tactic or out of frustration at the absence of sanctions relief. Enter Russia. As his April summit with Kim Jong-un in Vladivostok showed, Putin aspires to play the part of honest broker, whose intentions are noble: to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Korean nuclear issue and facilitate the creation of a stable security environment in Northeast Asia.
Putin — and Russia — would stand to gain considerable credit in the event of a successful diplomatic initiative. And if such diplomacy should fail, blame would lie not with Russia but with the major protagonists — North Korea, the United States, and China.
The Putin—Kim meeting in Vladivostok highlighted this. The lack of substance at the summit exposed it for what it was: an opportunistic public relations exercise, in which Russia was accorded the appearance of influence, while being careful not to exceed its Beijing-dictated brief. First, there is a substantial disconnect between ambition and performance. The Kremlin aims to re-establish Russia as a significant security actor on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia but lacks the capacity to make this happen.
Although some observers see Russia as a rising military power in the Asia-Pacific, its projection capabilities there remain modest, especially compared to those of the United States and China. It recognises that North Korea is at least as important to Beijing as Ukraine is to itself. Although the countries of the region are inclined to see Russia as backward, undynamic, and overly reliant on natural resources, it nevertheless has a notable impact in several areas.
Still, Moscow is keen to reduce its dependence on China by developing new markets in Asia. It has encouraged Japanese interest in various LNG ventures, building on the already substantial involvement of Mitsui and Mitsubishi in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas development. It has brought Indian energy companies into the Vankor oil and gas field in Eastern Siberia. Rosneft is also conducting oil exploration with Vietnam in the South China Sea, despite Chinese opposition.
So far much of this is speculative. Russia faces considerable obstacles in realising its ambitions to become a major energy supplier to the Asia-Pacific region.
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These include American sanctions, which have discouraged participation by Japanese and South Korean companies;  fluctuations in oil and gas prices, which have previously raised doubts about the viability of several high-cost ventures;  the impact of US shale gas; and the expansion of renewables, both in key markets China and globally. However, these difficulties are not insuperable, especially as Asia-Pacific demand for fossil fuels is forecast to grow strongly for some decades yet. For example, as China shifts from coal to natural gas in response to environmental pressures, its annual gas import requirements are expected to more than triple — from 91 billion cubic metres bcm in to bcm by Russia appears to enjoy an enviable geoeconomic location.
It is the pre-eminent Arctic power, whose Northern Sea Route could, in time, become a major transportation artery linking Asia and Europe. The EEF combines pitching for investment from Asian companies with political representation at the highest level. Xi, Abe, and many other Asian leaders have attended in recent years.
As in other areas, though, there are considerable practical difficulties in translating Kremlin aspirations into reality.
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If there is to be a Greater Eurasia, it will materialise on Chinese, not Russian, terms. The speed of global warming and melting of the polar ice cap suggests that commercial shipping there could become a reality sooner than expected, a development the Kremlin has welcomed enthusiastically. However, the opening up of the Arctic may turn out to be a mixed blessing for Moscow. Far from being able to project Russian geoeconomic influence, it could struggle to retain sovereign control. Moscow regards the Arctic Ocean as, in effect, Russian coastal waters, while Beijing views it as part of the global commons, much like Antarctica.
The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific
But there is possible trouble ahead. The notion of the Russian Far East as a transport and trading hub for Northeast Asia is implausible today. This vast territory comprises more than a third of the Russian Federation but has a population of barely six million and wholly inadequate infrastructure.
Over the past two decades, it has initiated several development programs for the subregion, but these have been undermined by bad planning, uncertain funding, inept administration, and poor project completion.